



**Common Security Evaluation &
Certification Consortium**
of GBIC and UKF

Common.SECC

Rule Book

Version 1.7

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Change History

Version	Date	Author	Changes compared to former version 1.3
1.4	1st September 2017	Common.SECC Coordination Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New Logo integrated - Integration of the Footnote explaining the abbreviation - Integration of migration period to PP v4 as announced by email to vendors and labs on 17th May, 2017 - Integration of mandate to use the registration form offered on www.CSEC-consortium.org - Clarification of delta-evaluation rules - Description of surveillance process according to www.CSEC-consortium.org - Integration of rules to issue certificates and certification letter - Replacement of “UKCA” with “UK Finance” - Limitation of the contacts to the Common.SECC Secretary - Integration of Annex 4 Source Code Analyses for trial use (see also Annex 3) - Integration of mandate to use the BSI Template (see also Annex 3) - Integration of a change history
1.5	1 st January 2018	Common.SECC Coordination Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New logo integrated (UK Finance) - Integrate new URL www.Common-SECC.org - Change of secretariat to Bill Reding - Dating all reference documents to 1st

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Version	Date	Author	Changes compared to former version 1.3
			January 2018 including new versioning.
1.6	29 th November 2018	Common.SECC Coordination Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deletion of Variant Certification (former chapter 4.1) - Clarification of delta-evaluations in chapters 2 , 3 and 4.1. - Clarifications in chapter 4.2 Surveillance process - Integration of new version of Annex 2: JTEMS Evaluation Framework, Requirements on Site Audits, Version 2.0, 29 November 2018 in chapter 6. - Integration of new version of Annex 3: Rules to perform a POI Platform CC-Evaluation, Common Security Evaluation Consortium Version 2.0, 29 November 2018 - Integration of new version of Annex 5 Re-Assessment Statement - Integration of Annex 6 Common.SECC Modular Evaluation Guidance, Version 1.0 29 November 2018 - Clarification on surveillance and maintenance, and introduction of new arrangements - Integration of new chapter 5 Particular Rules for the re-usage of Site Audits and the usage of product names.
1.7	10 th May 2019	Common.SECC Coordination Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusion of NO CVM PP and alignment of PP versions - Modification for re-evaluations - Mandate for SER templates in Annex 3 - Editorial changes

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1 Introduction

UK Finance and GBIC signed a Consortium Agreement to establish and maintain a common POI security certification scheme. They named the common certification scheme “Common Security Evaluation & Certification Consortium”, the shortened version of which is “Common.SECC”. The Consortium is based on ISO 15408 Common Criteria as the evaluation methodology to be used for evidence.

Eligible evaluators have to be accredited by a SOGIS-CC-Certification Body¹ for the technical domain “Hardware Devices with Security Boxes”².

According to the above mentioned agreement POI security certificates will only be issued by the Common Certification Body (CCB) of the Consortium formed by representatives of GBIC and UK Finance. The Consortium’s security certificates can be used by the vendors to achieve approvals by both GBIC and UK Finance. Both approval bodies will accept the certificates within their own approval schemes. Whether vendors make use of the opportunity for this multiple recognition is left to them.

This document describes how the common process of the Consortium works.

Stakeholders needing further information on the Consortium’s process should contact common-secc@ukfinance.org.uk.

¹ “Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security” (for further information see www.SOGIS.org).

² Vendors can chose an evaluator out of this framework (see www.sogis.org). It is recommended to choose evaluators which are active members of JTEMS (see www.Common-SECC.org). The Consortium will also accept evaluators performing a POI CC evaluation the first time for SOGIS accreditation.

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2 Security Requirements / Protection Profiles / Supporting Documents

GBIC and UK Finance mandate the use of JTEMS Protection Profiles and supporting documents for POI platform-security evaluations. The Protection Profiles cover the POI hard- and firmware which is called “POI platform” in this document. The payment application is not covered by these PPs.

Within Common.SECC the following Protection Profiles can be used:

- [JTEMS PP V4 COMPREHENSIVE]
- [JTEMS PP V4 COMPREHENSIVE_SRED]
- [JTEMS PP V4 Chip Only]
- [JTEMS PP No CVM]

It is the vendor’s responsibility to make sure that their product suits the approval requirements of the relevant approval schemes. Common.SECC is not responsible in this regard.

The Open Protocol Package included in the above mentioned PPs is not applicable for certification by Common.SECC as by using CC evaluation methodology the requirements of this package are covered implicitly.

The requirements to be met by a Common.SECC Evaluation Test Report (ETR) are defined in Annex 2, Annex 3, Annex 4 and Annex 6 (if applicable).

All requirements of [SECPUR], which are not covered by these PPs, must be evaluated using the current GBIC specific evaluation methodology. This rule applies to the security requirements which are to be implemented

- by the POI payment application and the EMV-Kernel and
- in the personalization site to import the girocard network provider encryption keys.

These GBIC mandates are not covered in the Consortium’s cooperation and are therefore out of scope of this document.

3 First Evaluation

The following process has to be followed for the first platform evaluation:

1. The vendor / laboratory registers at the CCB for a CC security evaluation using the Consortium's Registration Form published on the www.Common-SECC.org website.
2. The vendor selects an eligible CC evaluator and orders a CC evaluation to evidence the security requirements according to the PP mentioned above.
3. The evaluator performs the CC evaluation and delivers the ETR to the vendor. Vendors are encouraged to use the Consortium's Best Practice document (see Annex 1) for support; evaluators have to use annexes 2, 3 4 and 6, if applicable.
4. The ETR is presented to Common.SECC.
5. The formal conformity of the ETR to the PP and the other Common.SECC requirements mandated by GBIC and UK Finance is checked by the Common.SECC CCB.
6. The contents of the ETR are assessed by the Common.SECC CCB.
7. If both the results of the formal checks and the security assessment of the CCB are positive the Common.SECC CCB issues a Security Certificate, which the vendor can use to achieve a GBIC and/or a UK Finance approval or an approval of other approval bodies willing to accept it.

In principle, Common.SECC issues certificates for a POI whenever the delivered ETR strictly claims a Protection Profile being declared as valid by Common.SECC.

Beyond this policy, certification may be possible for other POIs based on these Protection Profiles but not providing for all assets defined in the PPs. For these evaluations Annex 6 must be used.

For innovative concepts or architectures Common.SECC also accepts ETRs including residual vulnerabilities. The residual vulnerabilities may be addressed in claims in the Security Target and the evaluator may wish to re-evaluate the device based on these claims. This may result e.g. in the change of the scope of the TOE to solve the residual vulnerabilities. These certificates can be used to achieve approval of GBIC and UK Finance at their discretion or other approval bodies willing to accept it.

Note: Registrations for POI approval (not certification) are handled separately within the approval schemes of GBIC and UK Finance and are therefore out of scope of this document.

4 Maintenance

4.1 Re-Evaluation

4.1.1 Delta-Report based on Impact Analysis Report (IAR)

If the vendor changes an already certified POI the vendor is obliged to deliver an IAR to the laboratory outlining the changes made. The evaluator investigates whether the changes are security relevant and need evaluation.

If the evaluator assesses the changes to be security relevant a delta report must be delivered to the Common Certification Body. To simplify the process for assessment of the ETR and certification it is recommended that the evaluator uses the original ETR as the basis for the delta-report.

The delta-report must outline the high level results of the vendor's IAR explaining what changes were made and why. The text must be marked with revision marks if the original ETR is used as the basis for the delta-report. This can be done in a [JTEMS PPv2] report if the original ETR used [JTEMS PPv2].

This process must also be performed in cases of emergency for already deployed POI when, for example, new attack methods are published and the changes to the POI to meet them impact the implementation of the security requirements of GBIC and UK Finance.

4.1.2 Validity of certificates

To achieve a new six year validity of the certificate the delta-report must demonstrate that the changes identified in the IAR are evaluated, that no impact on the already certified parts of the product does apply and that the whole platform remains secure. In this case the following re-evaluation verdict for the whole re-evaluated platform is required:

“The platform versions <all platform versions covered by the delta evaluation> pass all security requirements of <PP version used for the evaluation> and resist all known state-of-the-art attack methods at the time of re-evaluation.”

If the verdict in the delta-report includes the already certified platforms these POI versions are also included in the new certificate issued with a new six year validity. If applicable, variants that the vendor does not want to carry forward, can be dropped in the delta-report. This must be explicit via the revision marks and in the text of the delta report, and will be made explicit in the certificate.

If the above mentioned verdict is not included in the delta report because the re-evaluation has not re-considered the complete TOE and/or known state-of-the-art attack methods, a certificate is issued using the same expiry date as the original certificate.

4.2 Surveillance

The Consortium uses a surveillance process for POI security to protect consumers and merchants. It works as follows:

A Common.SECC Certificate is valid for six years from its date of issuance. Three years after the date of issuance a re-assessment of the evaluator is required confirming that the TOE version(s) certified three years ago still meet(s) the Common.SECC security requirements and resists all known state-of-the-art attacks. In order to achieve the same level of assurance a re-assessment for surveillance must also be performed for re-evaluations which resulted in a certificate using the same expiry date as the original certificate within three years after the date of issuance.

The re-assessment should preferably be delivered by the evaluator that carried out the original evaluation of the TOE.

If the re-assessment is delivered within three years this will be shown on the Common.SECC web page device library. If the re-assessment is not delivered within three years this will be indicated on the Common.SECC web page device library as “Re-assessment Missed”. The wording to be used in a re-assessment statement is defined in Annex 5. This applies to all TOE versions included in the originally issued certificate unless stated differently in the statement.

5 Particular Rules

5.1 Re-Usage of Site Audit Reports

All Protection Profiles listed in the References require site audits which shall be performed according to Annex 2.

Site audits can be re-used for three years. Within the following two years an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) produced by the vendor can be used by the evaluator to investigate the security impact of the changes. The IAR must include an evaluable description of all changes made after the original site audit. The lab's security assessment may indicate that

- no security relevant changes are described. In this case the lab does not perform a new Site Audit and will ask the developer to confirm the changes in a formal and signed statement letter to which the lab will refer in the ALC part of the ETR.
- the changes are security relevant. Depending on the assessed nature and impact of the changes the lab will perform a new site audit or will perform an assessment based on the IAR to which it will refer in the ALC part of the ETR.

This procedure only applies if the IAR assessment is performed by the same evaluator which performed the original site audit.

5.2 Usage of Device Names

The combination of vendor name and device name must be unique for Common.SECC purposes. If a vendor has two distinct devices with the same name that the vendor wishes Common.SECC to treat separately, then the laboratory should determine that. In such cases Common.SECC will append a version identifier to the second and subsequent device names for the purpose of listing on its web site, naming in certificates, and referring to devices for surveillance, maintenance and so on.

6 Annexes

Annex 1: Common Criteria Evaluation of POIs – Best Practice, Common Security Evaluation Consortium, version 1.2, 01-01-2018

Annex 2: Common.SECC Requirements on Site Audits, version 2.00, 29-11-2018

Annex 3: Common.SECC Rules to perform a POI Platform CC-Evaluation, Common Security Evaluation Consortium Version 3.0, 10-05-2019

Annex 4: Common.SECC Source Code Analysis Requirements, version 0.91 (for trial use), 01-01-2018

Annex 5: Wording for a Re-assessment Statement, version 1.0, 29-11-2018

Annex 6: Common.SECC Modular Evaluation Approach, version 1.0, 29-11-2018

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7 References

[JTEMS PPV2] Point of Interaction POI Comprehensive, sogis.org/uk/pp_pages/poi/pp_poi_comprehensive.html, www.sogisportal.eu

[JTEMS PP V4 Chip Only], see: https://www.sogis.eu/uk/pp_en.html

[JTEMS PP V4 COMPREHENSIVE], see: https://www.sogis.eu/uk/pp_en.html

[JTEMS PP V4 COMPREHENSIVE_SRED], see: https://www.sogis.eu/uk/pp_en.html

[JTEMS PP No CVM] NO-CVM Point of Interaction Protection Profile, version 1.0, 2019-04-01, see: <https://common-secc.org/documents-links/>

[SECPUR] Criteria for the Evaluation and Construction of electronic cash-systems - Security requirements for terminals in the purely chip-based girocard payment system, Version 1.0, 2013-02-20

[Registration] Consortium Registration Form, at <https://common-secc.org/certification/>.